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Much of  the recent research on the local 
public sector takes as its point of  departure 
the Tiebout model of  local finance in which 
individual households seek out a community 
of  residence that  provides  a  fiscal  bundle 
closely approximating their demands for lo- 
cal services. A central theme of  this litera- 
ture is the efficiency-enhancing properties of 
the Tiebout solution. In the "pure"  case, it is 
a straightforward matter to show that a sys- 
tem,  in  which  mobile  consumers  "shop" 
among  a  large group of  local jurisdictions 
that offer a sufficiently diverse set of  local 
public  goods  at  a  "tax-price"  equal  to 
marginal  cost,  will  generate  a  Pareto-
efficient outcome. The result  is,  in  fact,  a 
close analog to the private-market  solution, 
for, as Charles Tiebout pointed out, "Spatial 
mobility  provides  the  local  public-goods 
counterpart to the private market's shopping 
trip.. . . Just as the consumer may be visual- 
ized as walking to a private market place to 
buy his goods, the prices of  which  are set, 
we  place  him  in  the position of  walking 
to  a  community where  the  prices  (taxes) 
of  community services are set" (p. 422). 
The pure model, however,  involves a set 
of  assumptions so patently  unrealistic as to 
verge  on  the  outrageous.  In  particular, 
Tiebout assumed a world of  footloose con- 
sumers,  who  move  costlessly  among  local 
jurisdictions in response solely to fiscal con- 
siderations; the Tiebout household is uncon- 
strained  by  travel  costs  to  a  location  of 
employment or  by  any other  nonfiscal ties 
to a given locality. Moreover, access to each 
local  jurisdiction  in  the  system  must  be 
available at a tax-price equal to the cost of 
servicing the marginal consumer. 
While the model thus generates some ap- 
pealing sorts of  results, the demands it makes 
on  the  nature  of  consumer  behavior  and 
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institutional structure are formidable to  say 
the  least. The  issue  is  whether  or  not  the 
local sector in the  real world is sufficiently 
"Tiebout-like" in its structure and operation 
to permit the use of  the model for purposes 
of  prediction and prescription. 
This  is  a  hard  question.  As  the  earlier 
quotation  from  Tiebout  suggests,  it  is  not 
too  dissimilar from  asking, "Is  the  private 
sector  of  the  U.S.  economy  competitive?" 
As we know, there is not a simple answer to 
this  query.  For  some  analytical  purposes 
(perhaps, for a broad view of  the incidence 
of  certain  general  forms  of  taxation)  the 
answer may be yes; for others (as, for exam- 
ple, an antitrust investigation of  a particular 
industry) the answer may well be no. Like- 
wise, we are not likely to reach a definitive, 
general answer to the question of  whether or 
not  the  local  public  sector  is  sufficiently 
Tiebout-like;  the  response  will  depend  on 
the  specific problem  for  which  this  query 
has relevance. 
Nevertheless, there  has been  a consider- 
able empirical (as well as theoretical) effort 
over the past fifteen years that explores the 
workings of  the local sector from a Tiebout 
perspective. I wish in Section I to offer some 
brief  observations on this work before pro- 
ceeding in  Section I1 to  the  issue of  local 
production functions. 
At  the  most  basic  level,  we  can  simply 
look to see if, as a necessary  condition for 
the operation  of  the Tiebout  process, there 
exists enough diversity in the local sector to 
permit the kind of  sorting out according to 
demands for local services that is envisioned 
in  the  model.  Casual observation  suggests 
an  affirmative  response,  at  least  for  most 
large  metropolitan  areas  in  the  United 
States: a newly  arriving household,  for ex- 
ample, with  a place  of  employment  in the 
central city will  typically have a wide range 94  AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS  MA Y 1981 
of  suburban  communities  from  which  to 
select a residence. In a more systematic study 
of  this issue, William Fischel presents a quite 
fragmented  view  of  the  typical  suburban 
sector with a multitude of  local jurisdictions 
exercizing  both  fiscal  and zoning  powers, 
and in  which  the  concentration ratio  (the 
land area encompassed  by the  four largest 
suburban  governments)  is  relatively  low. 
Enough competitors appear to exist for the 
process  to work; however,  as Dennis Epple 
and  Allan  Zelenitz  (among  others)  have 
argued  recently,  sheer numbers, while con- 
straining the choice of  local officials, are not 
sufficient to ensure competitive outcomes in 
the local sector. 
Another  strand  of  empirical  work  in-
volves a long series of  capitalization studies 
that  have  examined  the  impact  of  local 
amenities and taxes on property values. Al- 
though the studies vary widely in choice and 
definition of  variables (for example, output 
versus  expenditure  measures  of  amenities) 
and specific findings, the results on balance 
suggest  strongly  that  fiscal  differentials 
across neighboring jurisdictions  tend  to be- 
come capitalized into property  values.  The 
interpretation of  this apparently straightfor- 
ward result has turned out to be quite com- 
plex.  On one  issue,  there  is  a  consensus: 
capitalization of  fiscal differentials is consis- 
tent  with  the  view  that  consumers  "shop" 
among  local  communities.  People  (not 
surprisingly) appear willing to pay  more to 
live in jurisdictions  that provide, in particu- 
lar, such amenities as superior  schools and 
greater  safety  from  crime.  The  empirical 
literature thus provides some support for the 
operation  of  the  "demand  side"  of  the 
Tiebout model. 
On the supply side, matters are less clear. 
Several  authors  (Bruce  Hamilton,  1976b; 
Matthew  Edel  and  Elliott  Sclar;  Epple, 
Zelenitz, and Michael Visscher) have pointed 
out that full-Tiebout  equilibrium would im- 
ply an absence of  any capitalization:  with a 
perfectly  elastic  supply  of  local  communi- 
ties, the benefits from higher levels of  amen- 
ities would be precisely offset by the associ- 
ated increase in local tax bills. However, this 
"strong version" of  the Tiebout model surely 
stretches  reality.  If  we  introduce some re- 
strictions on the supply of  comniunities (see 
Mark Pauly or Mahlon Straszheim) or cer- 
tain  forms of  voting  behavior  on the part 
of  residents  (John  Yinger),  a  "modified" 
Tiebout equilibrium will, in most instances, 
exhibit  capitalization.  Moreover,  in  these 
latter "weak  versions" of  the Tiebout model, 
the  outcomes are  no longer  so clearly  ef- 
ficiency  enhancing.  In  short,  there  appear 
no clear, unambiguous inferences to be made 
from the findings of  capitalization  of  fiscal 
differentials  as  regards  the  efficient  func- 
tioning of  the local sector. 
Exploring  another  implication  of  the 
Tiebout hypothesis in a recent and provoca- 
tive  study  of  several  hundred  towns  in 
Pennsylvania, Howard Pack and Janet Pack 
have concluded that individuals within com- 
munities exhibit  far too  much  variation  in 
their demands for local  services to be con- 
sistent with a Tiebout-like process. This is a 
tricky  issue.  First,  Pack  and  Pack  use  in-
come as a proxy  for the (unobservable) de- 
mand  for  local  services;  income  is,  no 
doubt,  positively  correlated  with  demand 
but not perfectly  so-even  if  demand were 
perfectly  homogeneous  in  a  town,  we 
would  expect  to  find  a  nonzero  variation 
in  household  income.  Second,  and  more 
fundamental, is the nature of  the test. How 
much variation is too much to  be consistent 
with a Tiebout world? The problem  is that 
'the null  and alternative  hypotheses  are un- 
clear. We might pose as the null hypothesis 
that  the  intracommunity  variance  in  de-
mand is at least as large as the variance in 
the metropolitan population as a whole; the 
Tiebout  hypothesis  would  surely  pass  this 
test  at a  high  level  of  confidence.  This is 
admittedly a  rather  weak  test, but  at least 
one with a sound conceptual basis. 
The  efficiency  properties  of  the  Tiebout 
model  also  depend  on  marginal-cost  pric- 
ing:  the  marginal  resident  must  pay  a  fee 
equal  to  the  cost  of  extending  the  local 
service to include his consumption. Tiebout 
assumed, in this regard, that the local service 
is subject to costs of  congestion. Empirical 
demand studies (see, for example, Theodore 
Bergstrom  and  Robert  Goodman)  have 
tended to support this result:  these studies 
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null hypothesis  of  a constant marginal cost 
for  an  additional  consumer.  While  this  is 
consistent with the Tiebout view, the mech- 
anism  of  finance  is  more  troublesome. 
Tiebout  himself  was  not  very  explicit  on 
this;  he  hardly  mentions  local  taxation. 
However,  most  localities  do  not  place  a 
central reliance on user fees; they employ a 
variety  of  revenue  sources,  often  relying 
heavily on property taxation. The introduc- 
tion  of  property  taxation  links inextricably 
the issues of  efficiency in local services and 
in  housing  markets.  Hamilton  (1975)  has 
shown  that the  Tiebout  model  can be ex-
tended  to a  framework  in  which  localities 
make  use  of  property  taxation  and  of  a 
zoning ordinance that specifies a minimum 
level  of  housing  consumption.  While  the 
Hamilton model generates a Pareto-efficient 
outcome, it makes even greater demands on 
reality  than  Tiebout:  the  Hamilton  equi-
librium  entails communities that are homo- 
geneous both in demands for  local  services 
and housing consumption. 
Moreover,  when  we  introduce  further 
complications in terms of  renters (who, many 
demand studies tell us, seem to believe that 
they pay lower taxes than owner-occupants), 
commercial-industrial  property  which  as-
sumes  part  of  the  local  tax  burden,  and 
various  intergovernmental grants,  the  pre- 
cise link between the tax bill of  the marginal 
consumer and the incremental cost  of  local 
services is broken. On this point, Pack and 
Pack cite a wide variation in housing values 
within  communities,  which  they  take  as 
prima  facie  evidence  that  tax-prices  vary 
substantially among residents;  some of  this 
variation  may  be offset through capitaliza- 
tion, but,  if  so, it comes at the expense of 
introducing inefficiencies into local housing 
markets  (Hamilton,  1976a). In  brief,  it  is 
unclear  how  closely  the  effective  tax-price 
facing  a  potential  resident  reflects  the 
marginal cost of  local services. 
While  the Tiebout  literature has at least 
addressed the issues examined  in Section I, 
it  has  virtually  ignored  what  I  see  as  a 
central problem in local finance: the nature 
of  the production function for local services. 
As  noted  earlier,  Tiebout  envisioned  the 
provision  of  local  services  to be subject  to 
costs  of  congestion;  more  specifically,  he 
postulated  a  U-shaped  cost  curve  with  re-
spect  to  community size, the  low  point  of 
which  served to define optimal community 
size. Most of  the  subsequent literature has 
simplified matters even further by taking the 
cost  per  person  of  a  given  level  of  local 
services to be constant with respect to com- 
munity  size; by  assuming identical produc- 
tion functions across communities and with 
an appropriate selection of  units, output in 
each jurisdiction  becomes identical with ex- 
penditure  per  capita. While  this  procedure 
simplifies the analysis, it overlooks an issue 
with  quite  profound  and  troublesome  im-
plications for public policy. 
My  contention  is  that,  for  certain  key 
local  services  such  as  education,  public 
safety, and environmental quality,  the pro- 
duction function contains as arguments not 
only  the  usual  direct  inputs  of  labor  and 
capital,  but  also  the  characteristics  of  the 
individuals  who  comprise  the  community. 
For public safety, for example, a given input 
of  police  services will  be associated  with  a 
higher degree of  safety on the streets the less 
prone are the members of  the community to 
engage  in  crime.  Likewise,  the  more  able 
and  highly  motivated  are  the  pupils  in  a 
certain  school,  the  higher  will  be levels of 
achievement. 
Somewhat  more  formally  (following 
David Bradford, R. A. Malt, and Oates), let 
I represent a vector of  direct inputs into the 
production  of  local  services.  For  schools, 
for example, this  vector could have  as ele- 
ments the number (and quality) of  teachers, 
schoolrooms, and books. The vector I maps 
into  a  vector  D  of  "directly  produced 
services. For education, D might consist of 
providing a given number of  students with a 
certain kind of  instruction (for  example, a 
specified series of  "standard"  mathematical 
lessons).  In  the  case  of  public  safety,  we 
might  associate  these  directly  produced 
services  with  particular  levels  of  surveil-
lance. 
However.  what  concerns the  residents of 
the community is not the elements of  D, but 96  A  EA  PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS  MA Y 1981 
levels of  final consumption:  the quality of 
the schools in terms of  student achievement, 
the degree of  safety on the streets, and the 
physical  attractiveness  of  neighborhoods. 
But these final outputs depend only in part 
on  direct  public  inputs.  For  any  given  I 
vector,  the  quality  of  local  schools  will  be 
better the more able are students; similarly, 
the  level  of  public  safety  will  be  higher, 
ceteris paribus,  the more law-abiding are res- 
idents. 
In  more  formal  terms,  we  can  express 
the  individual's  utility  function  as  U= 
U(C,,C, ,...,C,,Z)  where  Ci is  the  level  of 
consumption (final output) of  the ith local 
service and Z  is a  composite private  good. 
In turn, the production functions for the C, 
are of  the general form: C,=Ci( Di,  E)  where 
D, is the vector of  directly produced services 
function of  I)  and E is  a  vector  whose 
elements are the  characteristics  of  the resi- 
dents of  the community. 
Mv  central  concern here is with  the role 
of  the vector E in determining final outputs 
of  local services. There is plenty of  evidence 
of  its importance. The Coleman report and 
subsequent  empirical  work  attest  to  the 
overriding  weight  of  the  characteristics  of 
pupils and their families in explaining levels 
of  achievement  in  local  schools.  Likewise, 
population  characteristics  are  typically  the 
major  explanatory  variables  in  equations 
seeking  to explain  crime  rates  (see  Oates). 
There  is.  I  believe.  little  doubt  over  the 
moment of the elements of  the E vector. 
Moreover,  this  perspective  on local  pro- 
duction functions has two provocative policy 
implications. First, it points to an important 
role for local zoning ordinances as a means 
for regulating outputs of  local services. The 
existing
w  iocal-finance  literature  views  the 
central function of  zoning as basically that 
of  excluding lower-income households that 
will  not  make  a  contribution  to  the  local 
treasury  commensurate with  their  share of 
budgetary  costs.  Exclusionary  measures  to 
this  purpose  constitute "fiscal  zoning"  (see 
Hamilton, 1975). The contention here is that 
local  zoning  regulations  can  also  serve,  if 
admittedly imperfectly, as a mechanism for 
controlling  the  composition  of  the  local 
population so as to enhance the quality of 
local services; this is "public-goods zoning." 
Moreover, it may well be the case that, for 
services like education and public safety, the 
variables comprising the E vector  dwarf  in 
importance  the  budgetary  inputs  of  the  I 
vector. There may be only a comparatively 
limited  capacity  to improve  the  quality  of 
the  most  important  local  services  through 
the public budget. From this perspective, it 
is not hard to understand the jealousy  with 
which local officials regard their zoning pre- 
rogatives.  Zoning  may  be  the  one  policy 
instrument they have to exert some control 
over the more important variables determin- 
ing final outputs of  local services. While this 
view may raise some thorny issues of  social 
justice with difficult, and perhaps uncertain, 
normative implications,  1 would  suggest  at 
the  same  time  that  it  does  possess  some 
positive explanatory power. 
The second  implication  of  this  formula- 
tion of  local production functions concerns 
the  efficiency  properties  of  the  Tiebout 
model (see the appendix to Oates). In partic- 
ular,  matters  become  a  good  deal  more 
complicated.  Note that, in  this  framework, 
residents  of  a  community  are  both  con-
sumers of  and inputs into the local services 
in their jurisdiction. In  consequence efficiency 
in  consumption and in production  become  in- 
separable problems.  The sorts of  issues that 
arise  in  this  context are perhaps  best  sug- 
gested  by  a  provocative  example. The im- 
portance  of  peer-group  effects in schooling 
are  well  documented.  However,  in  an 
intriguing  econometric  study  drawing  on 
an  unusually  rich  body  of  data,  Vernon 
Henderson.  Peter  Mieszkowski.  and Yvon 
Sauvageau found for their  sample that the 
peer-group effect (as measured  by the mean 
IQ of  the class in which a particular student 
is placed) is not only extremely important in 
determining achievement, but is non-linear: 
"The  achievement  of  individual  students 
rises  with  an improvement  in  the  average 
quality of  their classroom situations, but the 
increment in achievement decreases with the 
level of  average class quality"  (pp. 97-98). 
The  implication  of  this  result  is  that  a 
mixing  of  weak  and  strong  students  will 
improve the performance of  the overall stu- 
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counter  to  the  interests  of  the  more  able 
students. Note also that it suggests an out- 
come that can easily be at variance with the 
sorting out of  households  according to de- 
mands for local services. There may, in this 
instance, be real tradeoffs both between ef- 
ficiency in  consumption  and in production 
and also among the well-being of  different 
individuals. More generally, the problem is 
that  the  efficient  consumption  of  local 
services will typically require, along Tiebout 
lines,  relatively  homogeneous  populations 
within each jurisdiction,  while  efficiency in 
production may, as in our example, point to 
considerably more heterogeneity. 
The explicit recognition  that  the  quality 
of  local  services  depends  on  community 
composition as well as budgetary inputs ad- 
mittedly complicates significantly the theory 
of  local  finance.  However, the  issues  here 
have  important  implications  both  for  the 
efficiency  and  equity  aspects  of  public 
policy. In particular, I don't see how we  can 
truly come to  terms with  such  major  con-
cerns  as  the  reform  of  school  finance  to 
provide equal educational opportunity from 
a perspective that  focuses on  variations  in 
expenditure per pupil. 
Both  the literature  surveyed in  Section I 
and my  discussion of  local production func- 
tions  in  Section  I1  suggest  that  the  local 
public  sector  exhibits  certain  "imperfec-
tions" when measured against a standard of 
perfect economic efficiency. While this raises 
certaln  troublesome  and  intriguing  issues 
concerning the actual workings of  the local 
sector, we  should be careful not to overreact 
to  all  this  and  effectively  "throw  out  the 
baby  with  the  bathwater."  The  Tiebout 
model  does,  I  believe,  generate  some  im-
portant  descriptive  insights;  I  have  noted 
earlier  the  evidence  supporting  the  opera- 
tion  of  the  demand  side  of  the  model- 
people appear to consider flscal variables in 
their selection of  a jurisdiction  of  residence. 
Moreover, in spite of  the various imperfec- 
tions of  the system, the existence of  choice 
among  communities  offering  varying  out-
puts  of  local services surely has some im- 
portant efficiency-enhancing properties.  In- 
dividual  households  not  only  have  some 
discretion  over  their  consumption  of  these 
services, but  the competitive aspects of  the 
provision of  local services encourage a cer- 
tain responsiveness to consumer tastes and 
put some pressure on local officials to seek 
out reasonably  cost-effective techniques  of 
production. While competition  among local 
jurisdictions  may  not  completely  eliminate 
the potential for self-serving behavior among 
local  officials,  it  surely  does  limit  signifi-
cantly  the  scope  for  such  behavior  (see 
Epple and Zelenitz). 
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